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Liberalization and deliberalization in Jordan
Dr Curtis R. Ryan
Unlike many of its immediate neighbors, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan has since
1989 allowed for competitive elections, some level of pluralism, and the emergence of
civil society. But for Jordanians who support the kingdom’s liberalization process, the
string of setbacks and disappointments in the liberalization process since the mid-1990’s
has become intolerable, with the postponement of national parliamentary elections
providing just the latest example. This essay provides an analysis of Jordan’s spluttering
liberalization process, especially in the context of rising regional tensions. 
Jordan’s King Abdullah II ascended the throne in February 1999 following the death of his
father, King Hussein, who had ruled Jordan for the previous 46 years. Hussein had only
sporadically supported very limited periods of political liberalization within the kingdom, but in
1989 he had presided over the most ambitious program to date. The process then, as now, was
largely defensive and at all times cautious. Still, compared to many other countries in the region,
Jordan’s liberalization looked to be the most promising and the most extensive. Since its origins
in riots and unrest triggered by International Monetary Fund austerity programs, Jordan’s
liberalization came to include the lifting of martial law, the legalization of political parties,
loosening of restrictions on the media and three rounds of national parliamentary elections (in
1989, 1993, 1997). The fourth round of elections, however, did not take place as expected in
November 2001. At the time, the regime postponed the elections allegedly due to a revised new
electoral law that required a system of voting cards that could not be prepared in time. A more
pressing concern, however, may have been the rising regional tensions resulting from the
Palestinian uprising - the al-Aqsa Intifada which began in September 2000 - against Israeli
military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
King Abdullah had dissolved the 1997-2001 parliament in June 2001, and then in July
announced the postponement of elections for a new parliament. But the outgoing parliament
had itself resulted from the controversial 1997 elections which were boycotted by 11 opposition
parties. With most opposition candidates boycotting the polls, the resulting parliament had of
course been quite pliant and pro-regime. Since its dissolution in July 2001, even that nominal
alternative set of voices was absent from Jordanian political debates. The next parliament,
should elections take place, can be expected to include far more opposition voices, including
Islamists from the very well-organized Islamic Action Front, even with a balloting system that
tends to over-represent more traditional pro-regime constituencies. 
Still, expectations regarding new parliamentary elections have been repeatedly dashed.
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the resultant
increase in regional and global tensions, the elections were postponed once again. The
government’s official explanation remained focused on the technical complexities of the new
electronic voter card system, but the elections, then expected in August 2002, never occurred.
With the United States threatening war on Iraq, the regime postponed the election again until
later in 2003. 
Clearly external security concerns have added to regime-opposition tensions on this issue, but
the monarchy is also concerned with internal opposition, especially over the possibility of
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another US-Iraqi war. In recent unrest within Jordan, government forces battled militants within
the southern town of Ma’an. The regime labeled its opponents “Wahhabis” - a word that has
come to be a generic term for militant Sunni Islamists, but which more importantly implies that
they are not really from Jordan. Similarly, civil unrest in Ma’an, in 1998, was blamed on secular
leftists who were pro-Iraqi or perhaps even Iraqi agents themselves. In these and other
instances, everything from local social unrest to actual militancy is blamed on various types of
“outside agitators.” 
While militant Islamists did assassinate a U.S. diplomat in Amman in 2002, this remains highly
unusual for Jordan. In the Jordanian context most opposition has been explicitly loyal, and
indeed the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood have a long pattern of understanding between
one another regarding regime loyalty and policy opposition. 
This type of pattern was codified in the 1991 National Charter that set the stage for limited
political pluralism and participation, but all within the context of loyalty to the Hashimite
monarchy. The tensions between the opposition and the monarchy, therefore, turn not so much
on the nature of the political system, but rather on profound differences regarding specific policy
choices as well as the desired extent of political liberalization. 
Thus, public anger over electoral postponements is part of the broader concern over unpopular
electoral laws, renewed restrictions on the media and government bans on such democratic
acts as public demonstrations. In terms of policy, the regime is intent on maintaining its 1994
peace treaty with Israel, as well as its intimately close ties and its foreign aid and military links to
the United States and the United Kingdom. Both policy areas are increasingly unpopular within
Jordan and have become sources of social unrest. Political parties and professional
associations have repeatedly made clear their anger over Jordan’s “peace” with Israel, while the
Palestinian death toll mounts in the West Bank and Gaza and while Iraqi civilians suffer under
the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq. While the regime has no intention of losing its peace
treaty with Israel, or losing its vital economic and military ties to the U.S. and Britain, King
Abdullah has nonetheless repeatedly made clear his opposition to both the sanctions regime
and Israeli use of force against Palestinians. Within Jordan, however, the political opposition is
as focused on reactivating the liberalization process as the regime is on internal and external
security. 
Jordan’s electoral delays, therefore, must be seen not only in the context of a changing regional
security environment, but also in the context of a broader liberalization beginning in 1989, and
more importantly deliberalization as the earlier process began to backslide in 1994. At that time,
King Hussein’s regime showed little patience for opposition to the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty
and, correspondingly, Jordan’s “political opening” began to close. 
The question of electoral delays, while important, is nonetheless not the core problem. Rather, it
is a symptom of the broader crisis between the government and the opposition, and indeed
between the regime and Jordanian society, over the entire political liberalization process. When
King Abdullah first ascended the throne, Jordan’s domestic and regional climate actually
appeared to be remarkably stable and the King showed no hesitancy in allowing municipal
elections to proceed apace in July 1999. It appeared that for the first time in years, the kingdom
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might finally be able to move beyond its difficult geography and its various security concerns, to
renew and consolidate liberalization at home, but since that time, regional and domestic security
has dominated the regime’s agenda. Since the second intifada began in September 2000, the
Jordanian government has feared that Israel will expel thousands and perhaps even millions of
Palestinians to Jordan. With the Intifada still raging, the U.S. war on Afghanistan (and the
Jordanian regime’s support for it) only widened the gap between the government and its
opposition. 
The regime’s response has turned not just on electoral delays, but also and indeed mainly on its
new campaign dubbed “Jordan First.” This slogan certainly conveys the regime’s nationalist
approach and its intention to tolerate no exploitation of divisions within Jordanian society -
whether between secularists and Islamists, or between Palestinians and Transjordanians. But
the slogan has also been read by the opposition as either avoidance of commitment to broader
Arab or Islamic concerns, or as a statement brooking no dissent, and hence no democracy,
within increasingly security-oriented Jordanian politics. 
Jordan has, until now, managed to avoid the Algerian model, in which democratic dissent was
eliminated as a possible avenue for political expression, rendering violence the only means
available to an increasingly radicalized and militant opposition. Jordanians suffered their own
brutal civil war, between the forces of the Hashimite monarchy and those of the PLO, in
1970-71. No Jordanian wishes to repeat that horrible episode, nor is it terribly likely, but while
the external security concerns of the regime are very real – with violence raging to the West,
and war threatened to the East - the fact remains that the electoral delays and other forms of
deliberalization have only undermined the regime at home. 
There may be a lesson here from the last national elections. The 1997 elections were contested
under a new, more restrictive electoral law, designed to contain the strength of the opposition.
Instead, it united the opposition, triggered the 11-party opposition boycott and undermined the
legitimacy of the electoral process as well as that of the parliament that resulted from it. 
Jordanians now expect elections in 2003, with a new parliament to be seated (including genuine
opposition voices) as quickly as possible. Then and only then will most Jordanians feel that the
process is at last underway again, with much still to do particularly on the issue of full inclusion
of women within Jordanian public life. For Jordan to avoid the fate of the many other garrison
states of the region, the liberalization process must be renewed, even in a context of rising
regional tensions, and perhaps especially so. 
In 1989, when political liberalization first began in Jordan, optimistic advocates stressed the
benefits of increasing pluralism, civil society and democracy within the kingdom. They also
emphasized Jordan’s potential role as a model for the rest of the Arab world. Since those heady
days, disillusionment and bitterness have set in for many, but the process is not over. Even the
“Jordan First” campaign has created committees drawn from key figures in society to examine
issues such as fighting corruption, enhancing the roles of political parties, strengthening civil
society and potentially creating a quota for women’s representation. The question remains
whether these committees are intended to contain participation, or to mobilize real participation
and promote meaningful social and political change. 
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There is still time to retrieve and then deepen the process of real liberalization. That would
make the domestic political climate more open to very vocal opposition, to be sure, but it would
also enhance the more genuine security of state and society, of government and opposition, in
Jordan. That can still be the legacy that King Abdullah ultimately leaves not only for Jordan, but
also for the Middle East as a region. 
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